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TEACHING THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF
TECHNOLOGY GROWTH ON
REQUIRED RATES OF RETURN
JOHN D. GROESBECK
SOUTHERN UTAH UNIVERSITY

ABSTRACT
As professors of economics and finance, we often teach that technology
enhances profits, which is well and good, and probably true from a macroeconomic
point of view. However, recent market experiences with respect to the technology
sector show that the process of technological innovation is often messy, and subject to
devastatingly high levels of risk at the firm level. It is the intent of this paper to
provide financial educators with some tools to incorporate the assessment, and pricing
of technology risk in the undergraduate and graduate curriculum.
I. BACKGROUND ON TECHNOLOGY GROWTH AND LITERATURE
REVIEW
The richest literature on technology growth is in macroeconomics. While the
evaluation of technology growth on the macro environment is important, the literature
are not entirely connected to the issue of this paper, which is evaluation of risk at the
firm level. It is sufficient to summarize that technology innovation is one of the
important drivers of real growth rates in output, which can generally be decomposed
into a few categories, namely:
Principle Drivers of Real Growth
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Growth in the labor force
Growth in the capital stock per worker
Growth in technology
Growth in other efficiency inducing practices
Growth in other inputs.

Since real growth rates in GDP range between 2% and 3% per year, the labor
force is growing a less than 1% per year, and net capital per worker (new investment
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minus depreciation) is flata, it is clear that technology improvements, while
significant, generate a net effect on real output of less than 2% per year. The reason
for this is the notion of “creative destruction” described long ago by Joseph
Schumpeter (1950; 1951).
While the literature regarding the macroeconomic growth process is rich and
developing, there is little written that links the conclusions of these recent model
developments to the financial markets, and to individual firms operating within an
industry. An author who has attempted to make this link, from a Schumpeterian
growth point of view is Philippe Aghion, who has written several articles with a
number of other co-authors. Of particular interest is the paper by Aghion, Harris and
Vickers (1997) wherein the authors model the implications of innovation-driven
growth that can occur via the standard leapfrog assumption, which is, that competitor
firms will continuously drive one another, switching places as the leader.
Alternatively, there are also step-by-step, and neck-and-neck processes defined.
Step-by-step processes occur when one (or presumably more) of the players choose a
laggard/follower strategy. Neck-and-neck processes occur when technological
knowledge is widely shared, firms watch each other carefully, and vigorously
compete for market share. In this article, the authors conclude that competitors are
more active in their efforts to innovate and gain advantage when the competitors are
roughly equal (neck-and-neck) technologically. Approximate neck-and-neck
competition can occur at times within the step-by-step and leapfrog processes at times
but are more frequent in the step-by-step process as opposed to leapfrogging.
Supposedly, this is due to the fact that adoption costs of existing technology that
brings laggards close to the leader are declining over time. This paper creates a
pedagogical model that allows for the possibility that lagging the technology leader
can be purposeful, with consequences that are not severe at all, and at times may be
beneficial.
An important line of thought one can derive from the above literature, that
needs to be developed in finance, is that increasing the rate of competitive positioning
via technology enhancements increases the variance of the distribution of net-income
performance within the industry to the extent that the adoption costs remain roughly
constant. This situation raises the perceived risk and required rate of return for that
industry. Where adoption costs are falling faster than the rate of innovation is rising,
technology risks could actually fall. Where adoption costs are falling at the same rate
which innovation is rising, technology risks remain constant. The implication of this
a

See “National Economic Trends” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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conclusion is that firms can adopt/innovate new technologies at a rate that can be to
their own detriment, as the cost of capital rises due to such activity faster than the
returns on the investment. If returns on technology growth are rising as fast, or faster
than the cost of capital, then profits can be preserved, but such is often not the case.
In 1992, Woody and Pourian pointed out that the risk associated with projects
creating non-traditional projects requiring high levels of basic research will, by
definition, require the use of untested technologies. Projects operating in this context
will increase the rate of return required by lenders. Another important paper that
nicely summarizes the process of growth through technology (and is also very
approachable) is one by Richard Jenner (1998). In this paper, the author divides the
technological growth into about four stages:
Four Stages of Technological Growth
1. Creation of a technological idea;
2. Combination of the new idea with other existing assets into a new
possibility;
3. Search for and consolidation into a dominant design for that possibility (eg,
vhs versus beta);
4. Seeking the lowest cost production methods.
At each step, the driving force that moves the process to the next step is the
desire to maximize wealth. Also, at each step, there is uncertainty and considerable
search cost incurred; and often times, money lost. The search process in steps two
through four can look at times like throwing a pot roast into a tank of sharks, which
creates a lot of activity, some of which is productive, and most of which is just froth.
Financially, there is an increase in risk if the number of technological shocks increases
per unit of time. Once again, the impact of technical innovation may actually increase
the variance of net-income performance over time per dollar of investment, as well as
increasing the variance of net income performance within an industry at any given
point in time.
The process of growth described above is an ideal form of creative destruction.
Often times, we teach about the “creative” benefits of technology driven growth,
which are certainly many. However, there are also a fair amount of “destruction”
effects that we often overlook, or do not understand.
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Whether the outcome of a technology growth process is one of sustained net
benefits, or net disruption, it has been the historical practice of investment bankers to
view these processes as disruptive in order to hedge their risks. Thus, these bankers
will subject all future expected returns to a higher discount rate to account for the
perceived increase in risk. In an article written by Rea, just prior to the bursting of the
tech stock bubble (2000), the author was arguing that old ways of evaluating a “new
economy” investment were overly punitive and should be modified. Looking back,
we clearly observe that there really is no “new economy” that is created by a
technology innovation, and that in the end, technologies bring with them risks that are
probably underestimated rather than overestimated.
One of the better treatments of technology risk comes from the insurance and
technology literature. An excellent case that also provides a framework for analysis is
by Hartmann and Lakatos (1998). In this article the authors show how the imposition
of new technology projects has many disruptive spillover effects on other projects
within the firm at least in the short run. One imagines that in the presence of higher
rates of technology growth, that the ratio of new projects to old projects will rise, and
that the rate of disruption will increase. Maia L. Hughes also succinctly stated
technology risks her 1997 article. Her statements included the idea that technology
risks are “potentially catastrophic... (and that) such exposures are often
underestimated.” She noted that technology risks include at least the following:
Categories of Technology Risk
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Business Risk (Loss of competitive capability, reputation, etc)
Infrastructure Risk (Hazards to existing systems, networks, etc.)
Project Risk (Risk due to unsuccessful project implementation)
Staffing Risk (Inability to attract, train and retain specific personnel)
Security Risk. (The extent to which technology projects expose proprietary
information unintentionally)

These risks overlap, and, may in fact be overshadowed in the long run by
realized gains, but these risks do tend to expose more traditional firms to additional
risk, and thus would increase the required rate of return.
In a brief note, Salierno (2001) reveals some interesting data from a recent
survey of 1,350 risk managers at companies with annual revenues in excess of $250
million. About half of those surveyed stated that they had only “fair-to-poor”
understanding of how technology risks impact their companies. In an additional
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survey in 2001, only 52 percent of American corporations have formally assessed and
quantified technology exposures at their organizations. These findings clearly point
out that we, as finance educators need to do a better job in this arena.
One of the primary drivers of technology growth has been the creation of the
semi-conductor. An explosion of innovation has occurred in nearly every industry
due to the invention of these devices. Early in the innovation process, Gordon Moore
(1965) evaluated the rate at which the efficiency of these types of switches was
advancing, and his conclusions continue to hold true today. Moore’s law goes
something like this: The number of switches per square inch of silicon chip doubles
every 18 months, which doubles processor speeds every two years. The impact of this
law on business is far from simple, however. However, if we assume that Moore’s
Law were true for all technologies, then technology growth rates would be around 36
percent annually, using the rule of 72. This implies that actual adoptable and adopted
technology growth rates are far less than the growth in processor speeds. This is
likely due to the fact that it takes time to integrate new technologies into existing
production paradigms, and, that as new technologies are developed, old ways are
simultaneously destroyed, thus creating a net effect that is far less than the maximum
growth in productive capacity due to technology enhancements.
The review presented above lists several shades of technology risk. Integration
of these concepts will mutually lead to higher risks for firms and industries. Observed
deviations in industry performance will rise to the extent that individual firms do not
adopt technologies in the same timing patterns. These considerations beg the
question whether some of the increases of the real rate of return in the capital markets
over the last 40 years are at least in part due to technology growth. The notion that
technology innovation can create a shock that disrupts the status quo, and often sets
off a frenzy of new activity, has profound implications on the required rates of return
in the market. This is especially true if technology growth is pervasive, while
recognition and adoption rates for those technologies both between and within
industries are asymmetric. These asymmetries could lead to increasing the variance
of net-income performance both between and within particular industry sectors and
increasing variances of returns that will be priced by the market. Therefore,
technology growth may be too weakly discounted, and may be responsible for the runup in real rates of return in the capital markets. Following that statement, the
pedagogical importance of this issue is that technology risks should be included more
explicitly as one of the many risks we typically discuss in our finance courses. The
potential disruptive effect of adding new technologies must be addressed and
accounted for.
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II. REVIEW OF PEDAGOGICAL MATERIALS/METHODS
Three authors, or groups of authors, dominate the corporate finance textbook
market. These include Brealey, Myers; Ross, Westerfield and Jordan; and Brigham.
If one reviews these texts (with various combinations of other co-authors) it is clear
that there is no specific discussion on how to analyze the disruptive and riskincreasing effects of technology adoption. While each has sections on risk
management, project analysis, CAPM, and include the idea of erosion, there is no
example regarding how increasing technology adoption rates increases risk, in spite of
recent market experiences.
Certainly, the tools for the evaluation of technology risk exist within finance,
and we apply those tools in various ways already. Only slight modifications to
existing methods are necessary to begin the process of enhancing knowledge
regarding technology risk. One way is to use traditional break-even analysis, where
the break-even level rises when increasing fixed cost and somewhat reducing variable
cost. One of those fixed costs could be related to technology acquisition. This
method demonstrates an increase in risk and therefore translates into a higher required
rate of return.
More complex modeling, using advanced financial education methods such as
Monte Carlo analysis, can be completed in estimating the co-varying shocks on
existing projects within the firm, which may lead to increases in the overall variance
of rates of return. The increases in co-varying risk can be due to negative spillovers
that accompany the sometimes-chaotic impact of rapid change, and the sometimesunforeseen cascading effects. Other applications along these lines include adding new
projects with higher betas to the existing portfolio of assets, while increasing the betas
of other existing assets due to the possible cost and revenue disruptions for those
existing assets. Most often, projects involving new technology should always have
higher than average betas within a firm, because by definition, the impacts of new
technologies on an organization for the first time have uncertain effects, which should
increase the variance that is modeled. Pure-play analysis will not often provide much
insight as to the relative risk of a new technology project due to the fact that such
projects rarely exist in isolation, allowing for independent pricing by the market.
III. SUGGESTED INSTRUCTIONAL IMPROVEMENTS
The most important conclusion finance educators should come to, given recent
market experience and the technical difficulties within firms that go largely unseen by
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the external public, is that technology growth implies risks that can be harmful to the
firm. Because technology is increasingly important to firms as they attempt to remain
competitive, a new category of costs along with a rubric for defining them should be
created. I propose that these be called “disruption costs.” Disruption costs should be
well thought out, estimated, and included in every cash flow model dealing with any
technology acquisition. Disruption costs are not necessarily the same thing as erosion.
Erosion implies that creating a new product line will reduce sales in existing lines.
Disruption costs occur in existing firms because new technologies are adopted, which
require the replacement of capital, retraining of people, re-design of organizations,
etc. These costs are only rarely foreseen in their entirety. Surprises often occur,
because we seem to not understand that technology growth, as “cool” as it is, imposes
cost. One could suppose that rapid technology growth captures the imagination and
hypnotizes its victims with dreams of “Star Wars” while it subtlety picks the pocket.
In the end, technology growth generally improves the bottom line (as we observe from
the macroeconomic data), but hardly ever as much as is hoped for, or promised by the
engineers and Information Technology staff.
Additional approaches should be developed that can illustrate the impact of
technology growth on financial risk at the firm level. One that I often use is
something I call “Context Shift/Risk Analysis.” This type of analysis is graphical and
intuitively appealing. It involves the notion that every choice made to adopt some
new process, product, or technology implies the creation of a new context, or future
reality. As a result, some current options are lost due to irreversibility associated with
that choice, while other options previously unattainable, are now possible.
A typical chalkboard discussion would be as follows:
1. Connect the idea that technology innovation creates increased risks for
individual projects, and increases the overall risks of the firm, which is a
portfolio of project assets. This can be done using typical project beta
analysis, or one could develop a correlation matrix with other projects. I
often use the Coefficient of Variation (CV) applied at project level. I like
the CV rather than a project beta for introductory classes because I believe it
is more intuitively appealing as it combines the risk-return tradeoff into a
single measure for comparison purposes. I demonstrate that new project
CV’s are often high, and that technology project risks often spillover into
the CV’s for existing projects, causing the standard deviation of returns for
the overall firm to rise.
2. I explain that the costs of pursuing a new project should include the
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3.

4.

5.

6.

possibility of disruption costs due to the destruction of old
methods/technologies, etc. These changes require transaction costs to
retrain people, dispose of old equipment/processes, and possibly be forced
to replace other interrelated systems/processes that end up being
incompatible with the new technology. These possible incompatibilities,
along with any increases in fixed costs, increase the overall costs of the
firm.
Develop the concept of a firm as an adaptive or innovating agent moving
through time. Explain that old projects are phased out as new ones are
created, and that multiple options exist at each decision point, both with
respect to timing, and alternative projects. Opportunity costs exist for each
set of choices. Drive home the point that good strategic managers evaluate
the consequences of the choices that drive this process in order to maximize
shareholder wealth in the long run. Connect this idea to the notion of net
present value of the firm.
In this discussion it is important to point out that the NPV of lost
opportunities is related to a condition called irreversibility; that is, some
opportunities are lost permanently by moving to a new
technology/production context. If there is no irreversibility, then the NPV
of lost opportunities becomes zero, although disruption costs may continue
to exist.
The NPV that should logically drive the technology adoption decision
becomes (NPVnew - NPVlost opps - PVdisruption cos t ), where the NPV of overlapping
opportunities are omitted because they do not affect the marginal decision to
be made.
Graphically show the net present value effect of disruption, and lost
opportunities over time due to technology changes via Venn diagrams as
follows:
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7. The final pedagogical tool I use is a thing I call the “Risk-Return/Context
Shift” graph, which really is nothing more than a modified decision tree that
maps out the Coefficient of Variation of the firm for various strategic
decisions involving technology that may create a new context in which the
firm will operate. It is assumed that the realized rate of return for each
option is held constant, and thus the CV’s become a comparable measure of
project quality. This graph is a follows:

Option Evaluation Points
(Mean Realized Returns Held Constant)

CV
A
X

B
Z

C

0

1

2

0

Time

Status Quo Option, with branch options A, B, C at evaluation point 2
Innovation Option, with branch options x, and z at evaluation point 2

Note in the “context shift” graph above, that the status quo option has a higher
coefficient of variation on average, meaning it has more units of risk per unit of
return. However, option C is less than any of the other options available. If the
decisions shown above are mutually exclusive and irreversible, choosing the
blue “Innovation Option” will lead to a higher level of overall risk per unit of
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return, assuming the probability of occurrence of every branch option is the
same. If the probability of branch option “C” is disproportionally small (less
than .20), then the Innovation Option becomes superior to the Status Quo
Option regardless of the duration of time between evaluation points 1 and 2.
The issue of risky disruption costs and new context creation with irreversible
outcomes can be very difficult to estimate with any degree of exactness. However,
the potential losses associated with these issues should compel financial professionals,
and the students we train to become such, to include these considerations in a serious
way before writing the check. Every new technology acquired should be exposed to
this brief, but very important set of questions that can be used as a handout to
students:
IV. TWELVE QUESTIONS BEFORE YOU BUY TECHNOLOGY
1. What existing systems and equipment may be incompatible with this new
technology?
2. To what extent and cost can the new incompatible technology be effectively
“patched” into the existing fabric of the operation?
3. If no effective patch can be made, what are the current systems that are
Most Likely, Likely, and Somewhat Likely to be replaced as a result of this
new technology, and at what cost?
4. What is the likely duration of any potentially disruptive episode, and how
will it affect cost and revenue flows from other projects during those time
periods?
5. What are the reliability impacts that this new technology will have on other
existing systems, revenue, and cost?
6. What human resource turnover and training costs will be imposed due to the
adoption of this technology?
7. What organizational changes and associated costs will be necessary due to
the adoption of this technology?
8. Do sufficient cash reserves exist to carry the operation during the period of
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disruption?
9. What is the financial consequence of doing nothing, on both cost and
revenue?
10. What preferred options may emerge at a reasonably later date if we do
nothing?
11. What legal liability issues and potential costs will this new technology
create?
12. Is the adoption of this technology critical to the mission and strategic vision
of the organization?
In addition to the questions presented above, financial educators could suggest
that some ratios should be established to assist in tracking the potential for technology
risk on the firm. A short list could include the following:
1.

fc tech
TC

= fixed costs associated with technology as a proportion of total costs;

2.

a tech
A

= dollar value of technology assets divided by total asset value of the firm;

3.

l tech
L

= compensation to dedicated technology support labor divided by total

compensation.
Once these ratios are established, they can be used to track changes in exposure to
technology risks, and possibly be used in an Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) model in
the second stage equation where returns are forecasted via indices. Other methods
would be to compute the historical residuals from a standard CAPM forecast of
returns, and then fit these ratios as a model on those residuals.
V. CONCLUSIONS
While explicitly modeling technology risk at the firm level is difficult at best,
there are a few important conclusions that can be drawn from the information
presented above. First, and most importantly, technology impacts are not always
positive at the firm or industry level. Second, it is important to understand that even if
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introducing the new technology generates higher levels of net income, the risks of
doing so are likely to rise, at least in the near-term. Third, the process of creating a
new context in which the firm operates, with the possibility of irreversibility, should
compel us to do something more than stare into the headlights of oncoming
technology like a deer about to become roadkill.
The place to begin greater understanding of technology disruption risks is in
our classrooms as we train the financial professionals of tomorrow. Based on recent
events, there is an essential need for financial analysts to more fully integrate
technology risks into their models. In no way, however, is this paper suggesting that
adopting technology is a bad thing. Technology may in fact cause profit to rise, and
well it should. This paper only addresses the risks associated with that adoption, and
more clearly pointing out that, once again, nothing good comes without a price.
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